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Good, Reason and Objectivity in Aristotle 
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle begins his investigation by 
exploring the nature of the end of all action. In the very first sentence of 
the work he says: "Every art and every enquiry and similarly every action 
and pursuit is thought to aim at some good and for this reason the good 
has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim" (1094al-3). 
It is easy, says Aristotle, to find verbal agreement between people 
regarding that good because they all consider it to be happiness (eudaimo- 
nia). Aristotle says: " Let us resume our inquiry and state in view of the fact 
that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we 
say that Political Science aims at and what is the highest of all good 
achievable by action. Verbally, there is very general ageement; for both 
the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is 
happiness, arrd identify living well and doing well with being happy" 
(1095a13-19). But there is no agreement between people with regard to 
what the good is. Some think it is pleasure, others wealth, others honour 
and so on, for each what happens to be most desirable to them. 
As is well known Aristotle's general method of approach to a new sub- 
ject relies on the endoxrg namely the respected opinions of society. But in 
this case, as he informs us, there is much and radical disagreement on the 
accepted even the respected positions within society on the subject of what 
eudaimonia is. For this reason, far from finding the truth in the respected 
opinions of society, Aristotle cannot use them even as his starting point. 
Thus we'find him turning to argument, a metaphysical one at that, in order 
to be assisted in his endeavour to determine the nature of the good at 
which human action aims. This is the well known function (ergon) 
argument. My concern in the present article is to study the steps of this 
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argument in order to reach an understanding of its concIusion. From the 
outset, Aristotle tells us that the argument will not determine precisely 
what the nature of Eudaimonia is but it will delimit its range, and narrow it 
down to a domain that is common to all agents. Thus, he ends his argument 
by concluding: " k t  this serve as an outline for the good; for we must pre- 
sumably sketch it roughly, and then later fd in the details" (1098 a20-22). 
1. Do Human Beings Have a Function? 
Aristotle intrcduces the function argument by referring to the notion 
of the ergon of a human being: "Presumably, however, to say that 
happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of 
what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we couId first 
ascertain the function of man ... if he has a function. Have the carpenter, 
then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is 
he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of 
the parts evidentIy has n function, may one can lay it down that man 
similarly has a function apart from all these?" (1097 b22-33). 
One of the most important issues regarding the function argument is 
the understanding of the use of the term function, or epon, here, by Ari- 
stotle. Recent commentators have understood this tern as referring to 
the Aristotelian essence. In particular, Reeve, in his book Practices of 
Reason claims that by "'function" Aristotle means essence, as that which 
gives the definition of something (p. 123): "All these things, in fact, are 
determined by their function, and the true being of each consists in its abi- 
lity to perform its particular function, of the eye, for instance, in its ability 
to see; while if it cannot perform its function it is that thing in name only, 
like a dead man or a stone figure of a man. Nor is a wooden saw, properly 
spealung, a saw but merely a representation of one" (Meteorologiea 390 
al0-14). 
I believe there is good reason not to take ergon in the present context 
to mean essence. It might turn out to be the case that by the ergon of a 
human be in^ Aristotle means the essence of a human being. But if this is 
so it is something we need to discover rather than assume to be the case on 
terminological grounds. The reason why I believe Aristotle does not 
intend us to take 'etgon' to mean essence is that in the very introduction of 
the notion of ergon he questions whether a human being has an ergon 
(1097 b28). Aristotle could not be wondesing whether a human being has 
an essence, gven that human beings, and biological substances in general, 
294 TH. SCALTSAS 
are the par excellence substances within the material world, and the 
primary examples of entities with essences. It could not be that Aristotle 
means 'essence' by 'ergon' and then question whether the paradigmatic 
substances have an ergon, namely an essence. 
The association of esgon or function with a human being has been 
taken by several commentators to indicate the introduction of a teleologi- 
cal account of human nature in Aristotle's Ethics. Urnson, in h s  book on , 
Aristotle's Ethics, attributes such a position to Aristotle and speaks criti- 
cally of it in the context of contemporary thought: "This purposive view of 
nature is, of course, frowned upon nowadays by theorists of scientific 
method, though if we are honest, we may find it hard to claim that it is 
entirely absent from our own thought" @. 20). In the same line of thought, 
Alasdair McIntyre, in his very influential book After Vir~ue, attributes to 
Aristotle an essentialist position regarding the determination of the human 
good. McIntyre says: "On Aristotle's account matters are very different. 
Even though some virtues are available only to certain types of people, 
none the less virtue is attached not to men as inhabiting social roles, but to 
man as such. It is the telos of man as a species which determines what 
human qualf ties are virtues" (McIntyre, p. 172). 
In opposition to the Aristotelian thought so interpreted, McIntyre 
himself develops a theory about the good of a human being which is based, 
not on essentialist mktaphysical positions, but on the role of a human 
being in society. The good for man in determined by the goals of the 
society in which he belongs, and the virtues of a human being are deter- 
mined by the social role that each individual has within the context of his 
or her society. Thus, McIntyre concludes: "Although this account of the 
virtues is teleological, it does not require the identification of any teIeology 
in nature, and hence it does not require identification of any teleology in 
metaphysical biology" (McIntyre, p.183). McIntyre considers his teleo- 
logicaI position of the virtues as an improvement on the Aristotelian 
position: on the one hand it preserves the teleology of Aristotle, but on the 
other, it frees this teleology from metaphysical biology. 
The attribution by McTntyre of metaphysical biological teleology to 
Aristotle's determination of the human good, is, I believe, misguided. 
Anstotle does employ teleological notions in his explanation of the nature 
of things in the world, but not every occurrence of function as final cause 
amounts to the introduction of what Aristotle calls biological teIeology. The 
par excellence basis of teleological accounts of properties or of the nature of 
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things is in the case of artefacts, on the one hand, and parts of substances, 
on the other. ArIstotIe's definition, for example, of a saw, determine the 
nature of the saw in terms of its use in society (Plysics 200 bS). The role to 
which an artefact is put in society is the determining factor for what that 
artefact is. It deternines the function of the artefact, and hence, its nature. 
With parts of substances, a fundamental principle in AristotIe's metaphysia 
is the principle of homonymy, according to which, parts of a substantial 
whole acquire their identity through the role they have in the whole, For 
example, if a finger is severed from an organism, the detached finger is only 
homonymously a finger. The detached finger has the name of a finger but 
not the definition and consequently, the severed finger is not a real fingef: " 
for they [the parts] cannot exist if severed from the whole; for it is not a fi- 
ger in any state that is the finger of a living thing, but the dead finger is a fin- 
ger only homonymously" (Metaphysicc 1035 b23-25). Aristotle claims that 
the severed finger has a different definition from the functioning finger, be- 
cause the severed finger has lost the capacity to function as the Iive one do- 
es with regard to the activity of the organism: ''it is not a hand in any state 
that is a part of a man, but the hand which can fulfil its work, which therefo- 
re must be alive; if it is not alive it is not a part" (Metaphysi~=~ 1036 b3b3.2). 
Aristotle" Homonymy Principle commits him to the determination of 
what a part of an organism is in terns of the function that that part has 
within the organism. This is a paradigmatic case of teleological explanation 
in nature. But does this account apply to the organism as a whole? 
Aristotle's cxpIanation of substances in the world rests on his well 
known doctrine of the four causes. The four causes are the material cause, 
namely what a substance is made out of; the efficient cause, namely that 
which brings about the creation of the substance; the formal cause? namely 
the form of the substance and essence, as given by its definition; and the 
final cause of the substance, namely that which determines the end of the 
substance's being. It would appear that the existence of an end or final 
cause in the substance introduces teleology ia the substantial realm. But in 
the case of substances, Aristotle, importantly, allows that thefiPaa1 cause be 
the same with the formal cause, namely, that the end of a substance be the 
essence of that substance. Thus in the Metap!ysics Aristotle says: "What is 
the material cause of man? The menstrual fluid. What is the moving 
cause? The semen. The formal cause? His essence. The final cause? His 
end. But perhaps the later mo are the same." (1044 a34-bl, my emphasis). 
This is an extremely important position in Aristotle's metaphysics, 
because the identification of the h a 1  cause with the formal cause has the 
effect of putting a stop to the teleological explanation at the level of each 
substance. Substance for Aristotle is the end in terms of which its own 
nature is to be explained. There is no further context, there is no further 
point of view from which the nature of the substance is to be understood 
and determined. A substance fox Aristotle cannot be part of another 
substance, and belong to it in an organic way. Substances are ends in 
themselves, and Aristotle says so in the Physics, where he says: "We, too, 
are ends of a sort" (194 a34-5). The implications of this metaphysical posi- 
tion are paramount within moral philosophy because they show that for 
Aristotle, human beings are ends in themselves. They do not serve fun- 
ctions over and beyond themselves set by contexts external to their being. 
Therefore, if we are to talk of the q o n  or function of a human being, we 
will not look for it outside that human being, in the way that we do with 
parts of substances or artefacts, where the context lies in the whole 
organism or society. With human beings, function has to be understood in 
the terms of the context of the human being himself or herself namely, in 
terms of their capacities and potentialities. It follows that teleology enters 
in a rather innocuous way in Aristotle's moral philosophy. The search for 
the function of human beings does not amount to their subjugation to 
causes over and beyond themselves. 
It should not be thought that this creates a problem for Aristatle, of the 
sort mentioned by McIntyre, namely, that the good for human beings must 
be determined by the biological nature of the species as opposed to being 
affected by the social context the human beings live in. I said above that 
human beings are ends in themselves rather than cogs of a greater system, 
whether that be a natural system or a social one. But this must be distingui- 
shed from whether the social context can play a role in the form and shape 
that the good for human beings will take. Human beings are social animals, 
namely their life and practice involves communion with other human 
beings. But this does not mean that the social forms of life determine what 
human beings are, or that it explains the nature of human beings as the end 
of these beings. Social life can enter and affect the shape of the human good 
in'other ways than being the end that determines the nature of human 
beings. It can enter the moral domain through the capacities and practices 
of human beings. Here, particular forms of social life are the result of 
human capacities rather than the determining factor as the end of human 
nature. In Aristotle's scheme, the social form of life is for the sake of the 
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human being, rather than vice versa. This integral part of human activity 
will play a role in the determination of the human good, so that we will not 
expect that the human good will be determined entirely on the basis of the 
biology of the human species. But when we are concerned with teleologid 
explanation the nornativity direction is what is of primary interest to us; 
and the point that I am making here is that the normative direction is from 
human capacity to the social form of life, rather than vice versa. 
To the degree to which social practices will enter into the determi- 
nation of the human good as ways in which human capacities realise them- 
selves, it would not be possible to determine the human good merely on 
the psychological traits of human beings, anymore than it would be merely 
on the biological traits of the species. In that sense, I am not in agreement 
with Terence Irwin's conclusion in his article "The Metaphysical and Psy- 
chological Basis of Aristotle's Ethics" in which he says the following: "The 
doctrine of the soul as the form of the living organism explains AristbtIe's 
conclusion that happiness will be realisation ofjhe soul; The function ar- 
gument, then, summarises the account of the human soul and essence 
which we have surveyed in the De Anima. ... His ethical theory is based on 
his psychology and therefore his metaphysics; the starting point of ethics is 
a feature of human agents which is part of their soul and essence, as 
understood by Aristotle's general theory of substance" (pp. 48-50). 
What is it that will lead us from the-psychology of human beings to the 
determination of the good for human being? Every psychological pro- 
perty of humans can find various different applications or ways of fulfilling 
itself. As we shall see, psychological dispositions will need guidance before 
they can reach what is really good for humans. Psycholagy, even enhanced 
with metaphysics, cannot deliver us ethical theory, and in this particular 
case, the human good. Nor can that be attained merely from practice 
within a social context, as many incompatible practices can arise from the 
same set of psychologicaI dispositions. What we need in order to reach the 
human good is something more than the biological, psychalogica1 and 
social capacities and dispositions of human beings. To that we shall 
presently turn. 
2. The Function of a Human Being 
Aristotle's function argument proceeds by attempting to identify the 
human activities that would characterise she function of a human being. 
He says: "What then can this be? Life seems to be common even in plants, 
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but we are seeking what ispeculiar to man. [My emphasis.] Let us exclude, 
therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of 
perception, but il also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and 
every animal. There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a 
rational principle ... and as this too can be taken in two ways, we must state 
that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for this seems to be the 
more proper sense of the term. ... the function of man is an activity of soul 
in accordance with, or not without, rational principle" (1097 b33-1098 a8). 
Aristotle does not find the answer in the activities that are common 
between human beings and other forms of life. He says that what he is 
looking for is a function that is peculiar (tdion) to a human being. The 
notion of a function being peculiar to a human being has exercised com- 
mentators, because on the one hand, the term idion is a technical term in 
Aristotle's Metaphysics, and on the other, its technical use does not fit the 
context in which it is put in the function argument. 
Jennifer Whiting argues that the term here refers to the essence of a 
thing, in our particular case, the essence of human being (p.37). She gives 
as evidence passages in Alistotle where the term idion can be used to refer 
to the essence of a thing. Although she admits that it is not a common 
usage of the term, she holds that this is the way Aristotle is using the term 
in the function argument. Yet, I do not see how this could be supported. 
What Aristotle is saying is that what i s  peculiar to human beings i s  an 
activity of soul in accordan~e to the rational principle. He has thereby 
excluded from being pecuIiar to human beings such activities as are 
common between human beings and other animals, and in particular the 
life of nutrition, of growth and of perception. According to Axistotle, these 
are certainly integral activities of the human soul and as such they would 
be included in an account of the essence of a human being. Since they are 
excluded here, whatever it is that Aristotle is taking about in the function 
argument as being peculiar to a human being, it could not be the essence 
of a human being as it would be a very incomplete account of the essence 
of human beings. 
A more frequent line of interpretation is that by restricting the domain 
of the functions to the rational activities of human beings, Aristotte is 
referring to the life of contemplation. This interpretation has been 
objected to by pointing out that the contemplative life is not exclusive to 
human beings, as it is shared by Aristotle's God as well. In an attempt to 
account for this objection while retaining this interpretation of the term 
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idion, Kraut, in his book Arkotle on the Human Good, has suggested that 
what AristotIe means here is that the contemplative life is peculiar to 
human beings within the animal kingdom; thus God is excluded from this 
domain (p. 316)- 
John McDowell, in his article "The Role of Eudaimunia in Aristotle's 
Ethics" renders the notion of what is peculiar to an I: as "what it is the 
business of an F to do" (p. 366). In the same spirit, Sarah Bxoadie, in her 
book Ethics with Arirtotle, takes Aristotle to be talking about rational acti- 
vity being peculiar to human beings in the sense of being most truly what 
human beings are. She adds that if other species are aho characterised by 
the very same activities which most truly chaxacterise ourselves, then, 
maybe for Aristotle the species in the domain of ethics simply differ from 
the species within the domain of biology. In this way, although we would 
be in the same ethical species along with God, we would belong to 
separate species within the biological classifications (p. 35). 
I believe that the inclination to interpret Aristotle's talk of what is 
peculiar to human beings as a reference to the contemplative life is 
exaggerated. It is true that Aristotle does introduce reason at this point, 
but it is not true that he is making a specific reference to the contemplative 
life. On the contrary, what he says is that the function of man is an activity 
o f  soul in accordance with, or not without the rational principle. This 
expression does not refer exclusively to a life of contemplation. On the 
contrary, very much in the spirit of the rest of Aristotle's approach to eth- 
ics, it refers to an integrated human activity, within whlch reason plays a 
role. This involves aH aspects of practical activity. Roger Crisp offers an 
interpretation of "activity of the soul in accordance with excellence" (1098 
a16-17) according to which "excellent activities themselves include or 
involve all intrinsic goods" (pp. 113, 119). The activity of contemplation is 
but a mere sub-group of the totality of these activities, and should not 
therefore be thought of as playing a prominent role in the present Aristo- 
telian demarcation of the function that is peculiar to human beings. 
3. The Role of Reason in the Human Good 
Let us now reflect on the sole of-reason in the determination of the 
human good. We have seen that Aristotle is building the function argument 
so as to reach to discovery of the good for human beings through the 
determination of the function of human beings. In this respect we must co- 
me t s  understand the role that reason has to play in the determination of 
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the good for humans. So far, Aristotle has singled out the function of 
human beings that is peculiar to them, and which has turned out to be 
activity of the sou1 in accordance with the rational principle. Aristotle's 
reasoning has been that just as in the cast of the flute pIayer we look for the 
good in the function peculiar to the flute player, thus in human beings too, 
if they do have a function, we should Iook for their good in their function. 
But we shall need a stronger reason than the analogy with the arts if we are 
to be in a position to connect the human function with the human good. I 
believe such a connection is possible to be made on the basis of what 
Aristotle tells us in Book 1 Chapter 7 of his Nic. Efh.; it needs to be 
extracted from his doctrine of the naturally pleasant as he does not 
comment on it directIy in connection with the role of reason within the 
human good. 
What I am proposing is chat we look at the way that reason functions 
for the determination of the naturally pleasant and be guided by reason's 
roIe there in understanding the way that reason functions in the deter- 
mination of the human good with respect to the activities of the soul. 
Aristotle says on pleasure: "Pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man 
that which he is said to be a lover of is pIeasant; ... Now for most men their 
pleasures are in conflict with one another because these are not by nature 
pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find what is pleasant things that 
are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are 
pleasant for such men as we11 as in their own nature" (1099 a7-15). 
What is AristotIe telling us here? He is mahng a distinction between 
the naturally pleasant and the phenomenally pleasant. And he is further 
saying that the phenomenally pIeasant i s  characterised by internal conflict 
as opposed to the naturally pleasant, which is not so characterised. First, it 
should be explained that the conflict that Adstotle is talking about here is 
not a type of practical incompatibility in the redisation of pleasures. He is 
not talking about difficulties that arise because e.g. the concert is sche- 
duled to take place at the same time as the lecture and therefore one 
cannot enjoy both pleasures due to a time conflict. What he is taking 
about are the type of conflicts that we have aIready encountered in PIato's 
Republic namely, conflicts about one and the same object of desire or 
aversion; for instance, in the case of an appetitive desire for more drink 
and rational aversion towards that drink because of considerations of 
health and well being. What Aristotle is telling us then, is that phenomenal 
desires are not mutually compatible; they do not harrnonise with one 
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another but rather are in conflict with one another; they fight one another 
and compete with one another. On the contrary real pleasures are not in 
conflict with one another but rather are compatible and mutually harmoni- 
ous. Internal coherence, therefore, is the criterion of objectivity in the do- 
main of the pleasures, since it characterises only real pleasures. 
k t  us take this criterion and apply it to the domain of the good. What 
the introduction of reason effects in the activities of the sou1 is to secure 
that there would be internal harmony and coherence between the obje- 
ctives of the activities of the soul so that they do not fight and compete with 
one another. Corresponding to the distinction between the phenomenal 
and the real pleasures, we can make a distinction between the phenomenal 
and the real good, which Aristotle does make in his Nicomachean Efhic.7 
1113a 20-22, where he does repeat that the apparent goods are in km- 
petition with one another. The introduction of the rational principle in the 
activities of the soul will secure that conflicts will be singled out and 
addressed by the soul, so that the pursuits of the soul will not lead to 
internal conflict. Again by conflict we do not mean practically confronted 
conflict, but internal conflict with respect to desires and aversions for one 
and the same activity. That is why Aristotle says that the human good is 
activity of the soul in accordance with, or not without, the rational principle 
in order to point to the guiding role that reason plays in the souls' pursuit of 
the good. The activities of the soul which are in accordance with reason wilI 
therefore avoid internal incompatibility and will be characterised by 
harmony and cohesion. Such a domain of activities wiIl be pursuing real 
goods in so far as the internal conflicts will have been sorted out by the 
involvement and intervention of reason in the pursuits of the good1. 
It is well known that the criterion of internal coherence is not a suffi- 
cient criterion for objectivity, in so far as coherence is no guarantee for 
uniqueness. Alternative conceptions of the good could be internally cohe- 
rent, which is why coherence is normally associated with relativism rather 
than with realism. Indeed, Aristotle needs further arguments and meta- 
physical as well as epistemological commitments in order to then use 
coherence to secure objectivity in the domain of the good. I have argued 
elsewhere -in my work The Golden Age of Virtue: Arhbotle's Ethics, 
Chapter 5, "Phronesis, Episteme, Truth" - that Aristotle's theory of the 
epistemic foundations of science (and of domains of knowledge outside 
I .  For an alternative rendition of the meaning of the expression 'mera logou', see 
Gomez-Lows "The Ergon Inference" (pp. 179-180). 
the scientific one such as the moral one) is such as ta presuppose that the 
e&, namely the opinions that have come to be believed as true and to 
be respected in a society, are true unless they conflict with one another. 
Given this presupposition, coherence is su&cient for truth. I have further 
discussed possible metaphysical positions that would support such an 
epistemological commitment in my article: "Socratic Moral Realism: An 
Alternative Justification'" (especially p. 135-140). I will not here address 
this issue again, as I am not concerned to show how the test for coherence, 
combined with other metaphysical and epistemological theories, can be 
agued to secure objectivity. My concern here is that Aristotle uses the 
coherence criterion for objectivity, explicitly, in the domain of pleasures 
and in the domain of beIiefs, and I am claiming that he is implicitly using it 
the domain of the good. What this means is that the introduction of the 
principle of reason in the activities of the soul that constitute the human 
function secures for Aristotle that the moral agent will not be pursuing 
phenomenal good, but wiIl be after the real goods. 
4. Is there a Fallacy in the Function Argument? 
We saw at the beginning of the function argument that Aristotle is 
interested in reaching the good for a human being by first determining the 
function of the human being. The good for the human being would then be 
found in the good performance of this function. Aristotle says: "Just as flute 
player, a sculptor, or any artist, and in general, for all things that have a 
function of activity, the good and the 'welI' is thought to reside in the 
function, so would it seem to be for man... and if we say a so-and-so and a 
good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre-player 
and a good lyre-pIayer, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in 
respect of excellence being added to the function (foi the function of the 
lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well). 
... the function of a good man is to be the good and noble performance of 
these, and ... any action is well performed when it is performed in acoordanm 
with the appropriate excellence" (1097 b25-1098 a17). 
What Aristotle is trying to establish here is that the good performance 
of a particular function is not a different skill than the ~r fonnance  of that 
function, but rather pertains to the performance itself; namely, the quality 
of the performance. In the case of the flute player, the good performance of 
his skill is not a different type of sla'll than a mediocre performance of that 
skill. The average and the good flute players exercise the same shll but do 
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it qualitatively differently. Similarly, in the case of the human being, the 
exercise or the function of a human being, namely, activity of the soul in 
accordance with reason, will differ qualitatively between people. But 
Aristotle's point is that the difference does not indicate the possession of a 
different skill or the exercise of a different function, but the exercise of the 
I same very skill or function, onIy better. Thus, if the function of a human being is the activity of the soul according to reason, then the good exercise 
of this function would involve the use of reason in all the activities of mu1 
where reason pertains towards identifying conflicts, comparing, contrasting, 
harmonising the compatible, and setting apart the incompatible, and in 
general aiming towards a coherent domain of desires , aversions, pursuits 
and attainments in the activities of the soul. 
The derivation of the good for human beings from the good perfonna- 
nce of the function of human beings has been criticised as a fallacy in rea- 
soning by P. Glassen, in his well known article "A Fallacy in Anstotle's 
Argument about the Good" (Phdoxophkal Qmrbery 1957)- Glassen says 
the foIlowing: "From the statement that the function of a good Iyre-player 
is to play the lyre weI1, or in accordance with excellence, what follows is, 
not that the good of a Iyre-pIayer is playing the lyre in accordance with 
excellence, but rather that the goodness of the lyre-player consists in 
playing the lyre in accordance with excellence" (p. 320). Glassen's point is 
the following. If the lyre-player performs his function well the outcome of 
this good performance is whatever the lyre-player is good at, namely the 
outcome is the goodness of the Iyre-player. But, says Glassen, there is no 
reason for us to take the goodness of the lyre-pIayer as that which is good 
for the lyre-player. What the lyre-player is good at might be completely 
independent of, and irreIevant to what is good for the lyre-pIayer. There 
are many examples one can contrive to show the independence of the go- 
od performance of a function by an agent from what is good for that agent. 
' I btIieve Glassen is right in making the distinction between the 
goodness of an agent in performing a function, and what is good for that 
agent. I further believe that he is right in saying that for Aristotle's argu- 
ment to go through a connection is needed between the goodness in the 
performance of that function and what isgood in the human being. Where 
I disagree with Glassen is that such a connection is missing from Ari- 
stotle's argument. Though not explicitly stated, I have tried to show above 
that the explanation of what the role of reason is, in terms of its use in the 
case of pIeasures (and in the case of beliefs), provides the link in the case 
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of the function argument between the good performance of the function of 
a human being and the good for that human being. 
The connection is the following. The introduction of reason into the 
activities of the soul secures the internal cohesion in the activities and 
pursuits of the human soul. I have shown above that for Aristotle the 
coherence between pleasures, or by extension, between the goods pursued 
by the soul, is what secures that the phenomenal pleasures or the pheno- 
menal goods have been excided and the remaining ones are the real plea- 
sures and the real goods. The good performance of the human function, 
namely the conformity of the activity of the soul to reason, will secure that 
only real goods are pursued by the soul in its choices of human actions and 
objects of pursuit. 
But let us reflect on this result. The good performance of the human 
function, namely the activity of the soul in full accord with the principles of 
reason, will secure that the agent in question will be pursuing the really 
good activities. The good performance of the human function is, as Glassen 
has pointed out, the goodness of a human being. But we saw that the good 
perf~rmance of the human function leads precisely to the pursuit of what is 
really good, as opposed to what is phenomenally good, for the human 
being. Therefore, the good performance of the human function leads to the 
pursuit of real goods by the human being. Thus the goodness of a human 
being (in Glassen's terminology) is precisely the attainment of what is good 
for a human being. Hence Aristotle's function argument does succeed in 
demarcating what is good for a human being, which consists in the good 
performance of the function of a human being (of the activity of the sou1 in 
accordance with reason), thereby securing the pursuit of real goods for the 
human being. Anstotle's function argument is not subject to a fallacy, but 
succeeds in reaching the result it set out to deliver. Glassen's argument did 
point to a potential gap in the steps of the argument, but there is sufficient 
theoretical material in Anstotle's argument to fill in this gap. 
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